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TERRY V. OHIO: A PRACTICALLY
PERFECT DOCTRINE
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG*

I. INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago the Supreme Court announced its 8-1 decision in Terry v. Ohio,' and placed its imprimatur on forcible police encounters with citizens when police lack both probable
cause and a warrant. We have now had three decades of experience with Terry, and this is more than enough time to assess
how well the decision has worked to guide law enforcement officers as to what is permissible and what is not, and also to protect the legitimate privacy rights of citizens.
Chief Justice Earl Warren assigned the Terry case to himself. It is apparent from the way the opinion is written that he
knew the case was important. Chief Justice Warren left the
Court not long after he wrote Terry,' and we do not know what
more he would have had to say about stop and frisk or whether
he would have approved of how the Terry case would be used
over time. Chief Justice Warren was looking forward as he
wrote Terry. We are looking backward as we review the decision. We can ask ourselves how prescient the Chief Justice was
and how well his approach has stood the test of time.
My thesis is rather simple and straightforward. It has four
Professor of Law at George Washington University School of Law, Hawrey
Chair of Trial Advocacy, Litigation & Professional Responsibility, and Director of
LL.M. Program in Litigation & Dispute Resolution.
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter. See id. at 35. Justice
Black concurred in the judgment and the opinion except to the extent that Chief
Justice Warren relied on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967). See
id. at 31. Justice Harlan filed a concurring opinion, which is discussed below. See
infra text accompanying notes 90-97. Justice White also filed a two paragraph concurring opinion which is discussed below, together with Justice Harlan's concurrence. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
2 Chief Justice Warren retired from the Supreme Court in 1969. See Editorial,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1969, at 38.
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prongs. First, Terry itself failed to provide a clear enough yardstick for law enforcement, and without further elaboration by the
Supreme Court, the doctrine might have become unworkable.
Second, subsequent Supreme Court elaborations on Terry have
developed a standard that is as clear as most Fourth Amendment standards can be and that is adequate to distinguish permissible from impermissible law enforcement confrontations
with citizens, at least as far as stops are concerned. In fact, the
results reached under Terry are practical, reasonable and defensible. They are practically as perfect as we are likely to get.
Third, the extension of Terry to a number of different situations
that are analogous to stops has been, for the most part, logical
and defensible. Fourth, the aspect of Terry that is most problematic and that requires a more subtle approach than the Court
has offered thus far is "the frisk."
In order for me to develop these points, I want to return to
the facts of Terry and its companion cases, and to the way the
Court framed the issue before it. It is important to know the nature of the police activity and the choices that the Court examined in its landmark decision.
II. RETURNING TO TERRY
A. The Facts
A veteran Cleveland police detective, Martin McFadden,
whose name would become a staple in all criminal procedure
casebooks that were first born from the many criminal procedure
decisions of the Warren Court, was patrolling downtown in plain
clothes when he saw John Terry and Richard Chilton standing
on a street corner.3 Terry and Chilton were strangers to McFadden, who had patrolled this vicinity of Cleveland for 30 of his 39
years as a police officer.4 McFadden's principal assignment was
to patrol for shoplifters and pickpockets, but he had developed
3 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. This fact, like the
other facts before the Court in
Terry, was developed at a suppression hearing in an Ohio state court. I assume that
the testimony given by Detective McFadden was accurate, and I rely on Chief Justice Warren's summary of the testimony in his Terry opinion. See id. I do point out,
however, some inconsistencies between the Ohio Court of Appeals's statement of
facts and the Chief Justice's. See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App.
1966), aftd, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See infra notes 11, 18, and 21 for discussions on these
inconsistencies.
4See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
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"habits of observation" which resulted in his paying careful attention to people he observed while on duty.' According to
McFadden, when he looked at Terry and Chilton, " 'they didn't
look right to me at the time.' ,6

Once he decided that the two men did not look right to him,
McFadden took no action to interfere with the men's freedom of
movement. Instead, McFadden decided to continue to observe
them.7 He saw them take turns walking from the corner a short
distance to a store window, pause in front of the window, and
then return to the corner where they would confer together.'
McFadden saw them do this perhaps a dozen times in total before a third man, Carl Katz,9 unknown to McFadden, approached
Terry and Chilton on the corner and engaged them in conversation.1" Katz left, and Terry and Chilton resumed their pattern of
taking turns walking to the store and back described above for
10 or 12 minutes.
Detective McFadden became "thoroughly suspicious" at the
pattern he observed, because it appeared to him that Terry and
Chilton might be " 'casing a job, a stick-up.' ,,2 But, he took no

action to intercept the men, to reveal that he was a police officer,
or to move closer to them while they were walking to and from
the store until the two men walked away from the corner in the
same direction Katz had gone. 3
Although the men were no longer "casing" the store, McFadden concluded that it was his duty to investigate the men and
developed a fear that they might be armed. He followed the
6Id.
6 Id. (quoting McFadden's testimony).
See id. at 6.

8 See id.
9 See id. at 7.
'0 See id. at 6-7.
" See id. Although Chief Justice Warren writes as though the 10 to 12 minute
observation period occurred after the men visited on the corner with Katz, the
opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Terry indicates that the state court
believed that the total time Detective McFadden spent observing Terry and Chilton,
both before and after Katz appeared, was 10 to 12 minutes. See State v. Terry, 214
N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It appears from the
portion of McFadden's testimony quoted by the Court of Appeals that its analysis is
correct. See id. at 119 ("Q. You observed these men for some ten to twelve minutes?"
"A. That's right.").
12 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6 (quoting McFadden's
testimony).
13 See id.
at 6-7.
4 See id.
at 6.
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pair and saw them stop in front of a store to talk with Katz.15
McFadden, with no information about any of the three, other
than what he had observed, approached the group, identified
himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. 16 They
mumbled something in response, but did nothing to resist or
avoid McFadden. McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him so that he
and Terry were facing Chilton and Katz, and moved Terry in
front of him so that he could frisk him while observing the others. 7 Feeling a pistol, McFadden unsuccessfully attempted to
remove it from Terry, and ordered the three men into the store."
McFadden then removed Terry's coat, took a pistol from it, and
ordered the three men to face the wall with their hands raised so
that he could pat them down. He felt a gun in Chilton's overcoat
and removed it, but discovered nothing that felt like a weapon as
he patted the outer clothing of Katz. McFadden took all three
men to the police station, but only Chilton and Terry were
charged, both with carrying concealed weapons. 9
B. The State Court Legal Proceedings
Terry and Chilton not only looked in store windows and carried guns together, but they shared the same attorney, and made
a joint motion in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County to suppress the guns seized by Detective McFadden."
The prosecution argued that McFadden had lawfully arrested
Terry and Chilton and had seized the guns in a search incident
to arrest.21 The Ohio trial judge rejected the argument and con-

"5

See id.

16 See

id. at 6-7.
See id.
18 See id. This is Chief Justice Warren's statement of the facts. The Ohio Court
17

of Appeals found that McFadden removed Terry's gun before ordering the three men
into the store. See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7. Chief Justice Warren does not explain why Katz
was taken to the police station. He might well have been detained as a material
witness, since McFadden did not know him and he was a witness to the weapons
offenses.
20 See id. at 5 n.2; 214 N.E.2d at 116.
21 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. The prosecutor might have felt constrained to make
this argument, because Detective McFadden, after moving the three men into the
store, told the store clerk to " 'call the wagon' " before he had pat down Chilton.
Terry, 214 N.E.2d at 116. But, since the Ohio Court of Appeals found that McFadden had found the weapon on Terry and removed it before ordering the three men
into the store, the command to the clerk could have been explained as McFadden
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eluded that McFadden had no probable cause to arrest the two
prior to patting them down.' The judge reasoned, however, that
McFadden " 'had reasonable cause to believe.., that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action.' "' The judge distinguished between an investigatory stop and an arrest, and
between a frisk and a search for evidence of crime, and upheld
Detective McFadden's actions.'
Terry and Chilton, ever the
pair, stipulated that evidence would be taken against Chilton
and would be applied to Terry.2 McFadden and Chilton testified, and the trial judge simultaneously rendered decisions that
Chilton and Terry were both guilty.26
Despite their lack of success as joint clients, Terry and Chilton prosecuted their state court appeals together, and actually
filed together a certiorari petition in the United States Supreme
Court.27

But for the fact that Chilton died after the Court

granted review, 28 Terry v. Ohio might have been captioned Chilton v. Ohio.
The Ohio Court of Appeals wrote that "[t]he right of the
proper authorities to stop and question persons in suspicious circumstances has its roots in early English practice where it was
approved by the courts and the common-law commentators."29
The court noted also that "[t]oday, in several states, the authority of police officers to detain suspects for a reasonable time for
questioning is granted by statute," or "is recognized by court decisions."" The court recognized that neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the courts of Ohio had decided whether a police officer may stop and question suspicious persons, and concluded in a case of first impression that "the better view seems to
having decided that, at a minimum, he was going to arrest Terry on the gun charge.
See id.
22 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8.
Id. at 8 (quoting the trial court record) (omission in original).
See id.
25 See id. at 5 n.2.
26 See id.
23
24

27

See

id.

See id.
29 214 N.E.2d at 117 (citing, inter alia, 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 122,
129 (6th ed. 1777); 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 89, 96-97 (Amer. ed. 1847)).
30 Id. (citing, inter alia, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1964) (current version
at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992)); People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d
32 (N.Y. 1960)).
26
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be that the stopping and questioning of suspicious persons is not
prohibited by the Constitution."31
The Ohio Court of Appeals reasoned that Detective McFadden had no intent to arrest anyone when he first encountered the
trio in front of the store, and that he intended "only to inquire as
to the defendant's activities."3 2 The court found that McFadden's
arrest of Terry occurred after McFadden discovered the gun on
him.33 The court approved the investigatory stop as a procedure
that fell short of arrest."
After determining that Detective McFadden could lawfully
investigate Terry and the others, the Ohio Court of Appeals reasoned that "it follows that the officer ought to be allowed to
'frisk,' under some circumstances at least, to insure that the suspect does not possess a dangerous weapon which would put the
safety of the officer in peril."35 The court asked two questions:
"What is the officer to do in this situation?" and "Are we to allow
him the right of inquiry and then, when this right is exercised,
reward him with an assailant's bullet?"36 The court's answer was
that "[the practice of 'frisking' is well accepted in police practice,
and police officers seem unanimous in stating that 'frisking' is
done for self-protection and not as a mere evidentiary 'fishing
expedition.' ,' The court was careful to distinguish a frisk for
dangerous weapons from a "search for contraband, evidentiary
material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds
to arrest."38 Thus, the court upheld Detective McFadden's frisk
for dangerous weapons."
3' Id. at 118.
32

Id. at 119.

id. at 121.
See id. at 118-21.
3'Id. at 120.
3See
34

"6 Id.
37 Id.

3

Id.

"The Ohio Court of Appeals appears to have had some concern that the United
States Supreme Court might not share its view of the need for police officers to investigate and to protect themselves. The court ends its opinion with a reference to
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), another well-known case in which the United
States Supreme Court overturned Ohio's approach to the Fourth Amendment. One
can readily understand the state court's sensitivity here, since the exclusionary rule
was imposed on Ohio and all other states in Mapp, notwithstanding the fact that
the exclusionary rule was not the subject of briefing and argument in Mapp. See
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 383

(5th ed. 1996). The Ohio Court of Appeals stated that the exclusionary rule should
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Having approved the investigatory stop and the frisk, the
Ohio Court of Appeals had no difficulty concluding that once
McFadden found the gun, he had probable cause to arrest
Terry.4" Thus, the court concluded that the evidence had been
obtained in conformity with the Constitution, and it affirmed the
judgment of the Common Pleas Court. The Supreme Court of
Ohio dismissed the appeals of Terry and Chilton "on the ground
that no 'substantial constitutional question' was involved."41 In
so doing, the Ohio Supreme Court removed itself from the discussion of stops and frisks.
Taking a very different view of the substantiality of the constitutional questions raised in the case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Terry and Chilton.42 The
Court was poised to address head on a subject that it had not
previously confronted. Before granting discretionary review in
Terry, the Court had noted probable jurisdiction in two New
York State cases-People v. Sibron," and People v. Peterswhich challenged a New York statute that specifically dealt with
stop and frisk. For reasons that will become apparent, the Supreme Court chose Terry as the case to announce its approach to
forcible police encounters with citizens short of probable cause,
and avoided dealing with the New York statute.
C. The Supreme Court'sReasoning
The first sentence of Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry
is as follows: "This case presents serious questions concerning
not suppress weapons obtained in a frisk, because the rule would have no deterrent
effect, "as police 'frisk' for their own protection rather than for the purpose of looking for evidence." State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). The court also suggested that, even if the Supreme Court would not
approve inquiries into suspicious activities and frisks by federal officers, "[1]ocal
problems of law enforcement are quite different from federal problems, and the
range of crimes encompassed by the states' jurisdiction creates more complicated
patterns to be dealt with." Id. The court ended its opinion as follows: "The necessities of law enforcement in large urban areas require the procedures utilized in the
instant case. We agree with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals when it
stated that it cannot believe that the 'Supreme Court has forbidden the police to investigate crime.' " Id. at 122 (quoting Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 700
(D.C. Cir. 1958)).
40See Terry, 214 N.E.2d at 121.
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
42 See Terry v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967).
N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1966), prob.juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967).
"219 N.E.2d 595 (N.Y. 1966), prob.juris.noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967).
4219
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the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the
street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances."45 Only after so describing the case did
the Chief Justice state the facts and the procedural history. Like
the Ohio Court of Appeals, the Chief Justice began the legal
analysis in his opinion by observing that the questions raised involved "issues which have never before been squarely presented
to this Court.""
Part I of the Chief Justice's legal analysis describes two
competing arguments. The first is the argument for a stop and
frisk rule:
On the one hand, it is frequently argued that in dealing
with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations
on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of
flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of
information they possess. For this purpose it is urged that
distinctions should be made between a "stop" and an
"arrest" (or a "seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk"
and a "search." Thus, it is argued, the police should be
allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for
questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected
with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person
may be armed, the police should have the power to "frisk"
him for weapons.... This scheme is justified in part upon
the notion that a "stop" and a "frisk" amount to a mere
"minor inconvenience and petty indignity,"47 which can
properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's
suspicion.48
The Chief Justice then turned to the competing argument
which interpreted the Fourth Amendment as providing much
less flexibility for police doing street work:
On the other side the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law
Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.

4C Id.

at 9-10.

Footnote 4 of the Chief Justice's opinion cited People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32,
36 (N.Y. 1964) for this proposition. See id. at 10 n.4. Rivera was relied upon by the
New York Court of Appeals in Sibron and Peters, the companion cases.
48 Id. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). The Chief Justice again cited
the Rivera case,
where the New York Court of Appeals stated that, since the stopping and frisking of
an individual is not an arrest, some grounds less than that required for an arrest
may be used. See id. (citing Rivera, 201 N.E.2d at 35).
17
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of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the
traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. It is
contended with some force that there is not-and cannot
be-a variety of police activity which does not depend
solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and
yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable
cause to make such an arrest.... Acquiescence by the
courts in the compulsion inherent in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is urged, would constitute
an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and
personal security by police officers whose judgment is
necessarily colored by their primary involvement in "the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." This,
it is argued, can only serve to exacerbate policecommunity tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's cities.49
Having set forth these competing arguments, the Chief Justice observed that Ohio's argument that the issue before the
Court is simply whether a police officer may make an on-thestreet stop for purposes of interrogation "is only partly accurate,"0 because the Court was asked to rule on the admissibility
of evidence and to employ the exclusionary rule, which meant
that its ruling would either legitimate or condemn police conduct.51 The opinion then digressed into an analysis of the limits
of the exclusionary rule as a device to control behavior. Chief
Justice Warren made three distinct points regarding the exclusionary rule, recognizing that: (1) "Regardless of how effective
the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful
prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal;"52 (2) "The
wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently
complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence

49 Id.

at 11-12 (footnote omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14(1948)).
'0Id. at 12.
51 See id. at 13.
62 Id.
at 14 (footnote omitted).
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from any criminal trial";53 and (3) "[A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact
a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime." 4
I say that this is a digression, because it has nothing to do
with the facts observed by Officer McFadden or with his principal duties as a plain-clothes detective, which were to observe
crime, stop it, arrest wrongdoers, and see that they were prosecuted and convicted. It may well be that this part of the opinion
represents the Court's response to the Ohio Court of Appeals'
opinion suggesting that the exclusionary rule could easily be
overused and its concern that the United States Supreme Court
may not understand the protean variety of street encounters
with which local police must deal on a regular basis. Whether
this is the correct explanation is less important than Chief Justice Warren's recognition that he had digressed, for he concluded
Part I of his legal analysis with a paragraph stating that he had
"roughly sketched the perimeters of the constitutional debate
over the limits on police investigative conduct in general" and
the Court would now "turn our attention to the quite narrow
question posed by the facts before us: Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a
limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an
arrest."5 5 Chief Justice Warren limited the opinion to this narrow question and explicitly stated that "we have no occasion to
canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of
a policeman's power when
he confronts a citizen without prob56
able cause to arrest him."
In Part II of his legal analysis, the Chief Justice rejected the
argument that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by a
"stop" or a "frisk" because the former is not a seizure and the latter is not a search:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less
than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that
Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 15.
55 Id.
6 Id. at 16.
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a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a "search."57
Thus, the Court had no question that Detective McFadden
seized Terry and searched him within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.58 In so holding, the Court declined to isolate stops
and frisks from constitutional scrutiny and to adopt "a rigid allor-nothing model of justification and regulation," in which the
Fourth Amendment either applied fully and completely to all
conduct in a uniform way or it did not apply at all.59 Instead, the
Court turned to an analysis of whether Detective McFadden's
search and seizure of Terry "was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.""
The Chief Justice observed in Part III of his legal analysis
that this case involved the kind of police conduct based upon onthe-spot observations which as a practical matter could not be
subjected to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.6 He also recognized, albeit less explicitly, that the kind of
decision McFadden was called upon to make would often be
based upon less than probable cause. 2 However, the Chief Justice stated that the notions underlying both the warrant and
probable cause requirement were relevant to establishing the
standard under which McFadden's conduct would be analyzed,
since the governmental interest at stake must be part of a reasonableness inquiry as the personal interest in avoiding invasions of privacy must also be.' With respect to the governmental
57id.
's See id. at 19.
5 Id. at 17. The Chief Justice criticized the New York Court of Appeals's decision in People v. Rivera, and subsequent cases relying on that decision. He reasoned
that the Court of Appeals had drawn too sharp a distinction between seizures and
stops and searches and frisks, and stated:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment
governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and
to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies
of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.
Id. at 18 n.15.
Id. at 20.
61 See id. Instead, the Court notes that the actions here must be analyzed
against the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures. See id.
62 See id. at 22.
6See

id. at 20-21.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[72:911

interest, the Chief Justice wrote that "in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."'
Chief Justice Warren identified the governmental interest in
Terry as effective crime prevention and detection, an interest
that justifies a police officer in investigating possible criminal
behavior even though he lacks probable cause.6 5 After reiterating
what McFadden had observed, Chief Justice Warren concluded
that "[iut would have been poor police work indeed for an officer
of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in
this same neighborhood
to have failed to investigate this behav66
ior further."
It is most interesting that the Chief Justice moved from this
observation to what he regarded as "[tihe crux of this case."67
For him, this was "not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior"; it was
"whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of
Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the
course of that investigation."68 This analysis virtually ignored
the potential "stop" aspect of the case, which occurred when
McFadden approached Terry, Chilton and Katz, identified himself as a police officer and asked for identification. Were they
free to leave? Was this a seizure? The Court neither asked nor
answered these questions. Instead, it jumped from McFadden's
investigation by observation to his frisk.
Once the jump was made, the Chief Justice cited data on the
dangers to law enforcement officials and wrote:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or
to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to
deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
'4Id. at 21. The Chief Justice stated that "[tihis demand for specificity in the
information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 21 n.18. Thus, the phrase "specific
and articulable facts" would be an important part of a stop and frisk analysis.
See id. at 22.
66Id. at 23.
67id.

68Id.
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weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.69
At this point in his opinion, the Chief Justice confronted another all-or-nothing argument; this one raised by Terry. Terry
argued that a police officer should not be permitted to search for
weapons until there is probable cause for arrest; a frisk is a
search and a search always requires probable cause.
In response, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that the argument failed
to consider the different purposes, character and extent of a
search incident to an arrest and a weapons frisk, and it also
failed to recognize that danger to police officers may arise before
probable cause exists to arrest.7 The Chief Justice announced
the Court's standard for frisks not based upon probable cause:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must
be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And
in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but
to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled
to draw from the facts in light of his experience. 2
Chief Justice Warren turned in Part IV of his legal analysis
to examine the conduct of Detective McFadden, and offered the
bottom line: "We think on the facts and circumstances Officer
McFadden detailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent
man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was
armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while

"Id. at 24. The Court noted that 57 law enforcement officers were killed in the
line of duty, 41 of which died from handguns hidden on the assailant, and 9,113 officers were injured as the result of 23,851 assaults in 1966. See id. at 24 n.21 (citing
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED

STATES 1966, at 45-48, 152).
70 See id. at 25.
71 See id. at 25-27.
72 Id.

at 27 (citations omitted).
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he was investigating his suspicious behavior."73 As the Chief
Justice saw it, McFadden hypothesized that Terry and Chilton
were contemplating a daylight robbery; based upon this hypothesis, McFadden reasonably assumed that the robbery would
involve the use of weapons, and nothing in his investigation gave
McFadden sufficient reason to abandon his hypothesis.74 The
Chief Justice concluded that the Court could not say that
McFadden's decision to "seize Terry and pat his clothing for
weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination,
or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment."75 Instead,
the Court saw a veteran police officer who made a quick decision
to protect himself and others from danger.7"
The Chief Justice focused on the manner in which the seizure and search took place and declined to "develop at length in
this case ... the limitations which the Fourth Amendment
places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons."77 The
Court said it would "[sluffice it to note that such a search, unlike
a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not
justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction
of evidence of crime," and emphasized that "[tlhe sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault
of the police officer."7" McFadden's pat down of Terry satisfied
the Court, because it was limited to discovering weapons and
was not a general exploratory search for evidence.79
In Part V of his legal analysis, the Chief Justice reiterated in
a paragraph what was stated in the first four parts. He emphasized that "[ejach case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts."" He then repeated the holding of the
'

Id. at 28.

7'

See id.

75

Id.

76 See

id. (characterizing the officer's "limited steps" to protect himself and oth-

ers).
77
78

Id. at 28-29.
id.

79 See

id. at 29-30 (reasoning that the officer did not place his hands inside
Terry or Chilton's pockets until he felt their weapons during the pat down, never
searched the third man beyond the pat down and "confined his search strictly to
what was minimally necessary").
8 Id. at 30.
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Court:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."'
D. The Limits of the Warren Opinion
Chief Justice Warren's legal analysis began with an examination of the exclusionary rule and a discussion of searches and
seizures82 and arguments that stops and frisks were not really
searches and seizuresY As his analysis proceeded, it became
narrower and narrower until it ended with the limited holding
quoted immediately above. Indeed, if the limited holding is
parsed, the Court would appear to have decided little and to
have left most issues open for future cases. If one takes the
Chief Justice at his word, the Court decided only as follows:
1. A police officer who "observes unusual conduct,"
2. and who reasonablyconcludes,
3. based on the officer's experience,
4. that "criminal activity may be afoot,"
5. and that persons may be "armed and presently dangerous,"
6. and the officer identifies himself as a police officer,
7. and makes "reasonableinquiries,"
8. and nothing dispels the officer's fear for his or others'
safety-then
9. the officer may "conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing,"
10. in an attempt "to discover weapons which might be used
s Id.
See id. at 12-15.
See id. at 16-17.
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to assault the officer."8
Such a holding provides virtually no guidance to either the
police or the public as to what a police officer may do when confronting suspicious behavior. Notwithstanding the fact that
Terry is widely known today as a reasonable suspicion case and
as establishing a reasonable suspicion standard, one can find
nothing in Chief Justice Warren's opinion to support the claim
that he thought that was the standard the Court was adopting.
Once we look at the companion cases to Terry, we will understand a little better why the Chief Justice wrote as narrowly as
he did.
E. The Breadth of the Opinion
Despite the narrowness of the Court's holding, there are aspects of Terry that suggest the Court was quite aware of and
sympathetic to the difficulties that law enforcement officers face
when they are called upon to make split-second decisions.' It is
notable, for example, that the Court never mentions what kind of
store Terry and Chilton were casing as McFadden watched
them." The failure to make any mention must have meant that,
for the Court, the type of store was not very important. A review
of the Ohio Court of Appeal's decision reveals that it was either
an airline office or a jewelry store.8 7 It is not difficult to imagine
an opinion that would give some weight to the supposed target of
an armed robbery in assessing the reasonableness of the police
officer's judgment that two strangers were actually casing a
store with an eye to robbing it. The Court's inattention to the
store represents respect for the street officer's judgment that an
armed robbery of any store which has cash or valuables is possible.
Perhaps more significant is the failure of the Chief Justice
even to mention the most obvious problem with the judgment
that Detective McFadden made, i.e., Terry and Chilton had
walked away from the store and the window into which they had

Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
See id. at 13 (noting that such encounters may by "wholly friendly," "hostile
confrontations" or those that "take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the conversation").
See id. at 6.
8 See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
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gazed so many times. By walking away, they might well have
signaled their decision not to engage in any criminal act, and
they surely might have signaled that they were no present threat
to anyone. The Chief Justice's decision to ignore their movement
away from the target store is another example of deference to the
experience and judgment of the street officer. The Chief Justice
understood that Detective McFadden and others like him could
not be present indefinitely in front of a single store, if they were
to do their jobs, and they must sometimes act when criminal activity may be "afoot" or lurking.8 9 Thus, Terry's holding, as limited as it purported to be, was adopted against a factual backdrop in which the Court was not very concerned about the nature
of the target or the actual likelihood of imminent criminal action.
F. Justice Harlan'sConcurrence
Justice Harlan's concurrence plainly recognized that the
Terry language would serve as "initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law develops."" Agreeing completely with
all that the Chief Justice said about stops and frisks being
bounded by the Fourth Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote that
"[i]f the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could,
on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk
and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I
would have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such
authority could be constitutionally reasonable."91 Noting that
Ohio had not conferred such authority on its officers, Justice
Harlan reasoned that the Ohio courts relied on the necessities of
the situation and he agreed with their analysis. 2
Justice Harlan explained that "if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the
officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop,"9 3 and explicitly declared that "I
would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
9Id. at 30.
gId. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9'Id. (emphasis added). It is worth noting that Justice Harlan said that such
action could be constitutionally reasonable, not that it would be.
92See id. at 32.
93Id.
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depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate
a suspected crime,"' and emphasized that "[wihere such a stop is
reasonable.., the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." 95
Detective McFadden's conduct illustrated, for Justice Harlan, a proper stop and an incidental frisk. Justice Harlan found
that McFadden could have reasonably suspected that Terry was
about to engage in either a burglary or a robbery." According to
Justice Harlan, his reasonable suspicion amounted to
"circumstances [that] warranted forcing an encounter with
97
Terry... to prevent or investigate a crime."
G. Justice White's Concurrence
Justice White offered a two-paragraph concurrence, the first
of which is a single sentence reserving judgment on some of the
Court's comments on the exclusionary rule. 98 The second paragraph begins with Justice White's offering "an additional
word... concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop."99 Justice White distinguished encounters between police officers and citizens in which citizens are free to
leave and may refuse to cooperate from encounters characterized
as temporary detentions, and reasoned that "it is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies
the protective frisk for weapons."'0 0 Justice White reasoned that,
whether or not weapons are found, "if the investigative stop is
sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process."1 1

Id. at 33.
95Id.
9

See id.

97Id. at 34
98 See

id. (White, J., concurring).
Id. (indicating his view that Detective McFadden made an investigative stop
in addition to performing a frisk).
100Id. at 34.
o Id. at 35 (emphasis added) (phrasing his opinion, like Justice Harlan, by
choosing words that fell short of a clear announcement that investigatory stops
would be upheld, even if reasonable under the circumstances).
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H. Justice Douglas'sDissent
Justice Douglas dissented and argued that it was a mystery
how the Court could uphold a search and seizure without probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, was in
the process of being committed, or was about to be committed.0 2
His principal concern was that, before Terry, police were excused
from obtaining warrants under various circumstances, but were
required to have the same probable cause that a magistrate
could require if a warrant were sought."°3 Interestingly, he complains that "[t]he term 'probable cause' rings a bell of certainty
that is not sounded by phrases such as 'reasonable suspicion.' ""o
Since Chief Justice Warren did not hint let alone hold that the
Court was adopting a reasonable suspicion standard, Justice
Douglas was responding to a standard which was not yet the law
but which he undoubtedly foresaw would be. His dissent was
more clearly directed to Justice Harlan's concurrence than to the
majority's holding, and it may well be that Justice Douglas understood that Justice Harlan's logic could not be denied.
III. THE COMPANION CASES

To understand why Chief Justice Warren attempted to narrow the holding of Terry, it is useful to examine the two cases
that were argued and decided with Terry: Peters v. New York,
and Sibron v. New York." 5 Chief Justice Warren wrote the
opinion in these cases as well as Terry, and they shed considerable light on the reasons why no clear standard to govern police
behavior is set forth in Terry. Both of the companion cases
"ar[olse in the context of New York's 'stop and frisk' law, N.Y.
Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a."0 6 The New York statute contained
the following two paragraphs:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public
place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the
crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this
chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
102 See

id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

'" See id. at 36-38.
'04 Id. at 37.

'05392 U.S. 40 (1968).
"6 Id. at 43.
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2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that
he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person
for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a
weapon or any other thing the possession of which may
constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the
completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return
it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such per7
son.

A. Peters and Sibron-The State Court Decisions
John Peters was convicted of possession of burglar tools after being arrested by Samuel Lasky, an 18-year veteran patrolman with the New York City Police Department. 108 Lasky was
home in his top-floor apartment when he heard a noise at his
front door and subsequently saw through his peephole two men
tiptoeing about the hallway. Lasky phoned the police, returned
to his door, and saw the men continue to tiptoe toward the
stairway.'O' Gun in hand, Lasky slammed his door, he heard
footsteps running down the stairs, and he gave chase. Lasky,
who had lived in the apartment for 12 years, caught Peters on
the stairway between floors, but did not recognize him, and inquired into Peters's presence in the building."' Peters claimed
that he was looking for a girlfriend whom he would not identify
because she was married. Lasky brought Peters to the nearest
floor and frisked him for a weapon. Lasky felt something like a
knife, withdrew an unsealed opaque envelope from Peters's
pants pocket, opened the envelope, and saw burglary tools."'
Peters moved to suppress the tools when he was charged
with their possession. The state trial judge denied the motion to
suppress, after which Peters pled guilty. 12 The New York Court
of Appeals upheld the conviction by a 5-2 vote."'

'07 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1964) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC.

LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992)).
108 See People v. Peters, 219 N.E.2d 595, 596-97 (N.Y. 1966) (mem.), af/'d sub
nora., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
'0 See id. at 596.
10

See id. at 596-97.

111See id.
112 See id.
3 See id. at 601-02.
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Although the state relied upon the New York statute to defend Lasky's actions," the Court of Appeals relied upon its prior
decision in People v. Rivera,15 and concluded that Lasky's actions
were proper even without the statute. 116 The Court of Appeals
found that the "suspicious circumstances" warranted Lasky's
stopping Peters and inquiring as to his presence in the building,
because Lasky's actions were supported by reasonable suspicion. 7 The Court observed that "[tihe conflict between the desire to be free from any police detention and the long-recognized
need for police inquiry must be resolved by striking a fair balance."' The Court also noted that "[bly requiring the reasonable
suspicion of a police officer, the statute incorporates the experienced police officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal of the
appearances of criminal activity," and "[h]is evaluation of the
various factors involved insures a protective, as well as definitive, standard.""'
The Court of Appeals also found Lasky's frisk to be reasonable under the circumstances: "[A] single officer collared a single
defendant in the.., confines of a stairway," and "a second suspect [was] still on the loose." 2 ' The Court concluded that "[niot
only was Lasky's frisk legal, it was necessary-it would have
been extremely poor police work not to have frisked the defendant in such a situation." 2' Thus, the Court explicitly approved
"reasonable suspicion" as a constitutionally adequate standard
for a detention for investigation and argued that the standard is
"no less endowed with an objective meaning than is the phrase
'probable cause.' ,122 The majority predicted that "[clourts will
have no difficulty in applying this standard and have frequently
See People v. Peters, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (County Ct. 1964), affd, 265
N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1965), affd, 219 N.E.2d 595 (N.Y. 1966) (mem.), affd sub
nom., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
"6 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1964) (holding that the Fourth Amendment restriction
applies only to unreasonable searches, not all searches). As discussed by the New
York Court of Appeals in Peters,Rivera involved three policemen and two suspects
on a street at night, where the frisk resulted in the seizure of a weapon. See Peters,
219 N.E.2d at 598.
114

116
117

See Peters, 219 N.E.2d at 597.

Id.

118 Id.

at 599.

119Id.
120Id. at

598.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
1'2Id. at 599.
121
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in the past referred to 'suspicion' or 'reasonable suspicion' as
terms with a definite meaning, somewhat below probable cause
on the scale of absolute knowledge of criminal activity."2 '
In addition, the Court dlarified that a frisk must be justified
by reasonable suspicion, and defined a frisk as "the patting of
the exterior of one's clothing in order to detect by touch the presence of a concealed weapon."124 The Court stated that " '[tihe
frisk is less such invasion in degree than an initial full search of
the person would be,' ""' and "[w]here... circumstances warrant
the reasonable officer in suspecting that he is in danger of life or
limb, the person may be searched
for a dangerous weapon in the
26
least obtrusive manner."
The Court of Appeals defined "probable cause" as requiring
"satisfactory grounds for believing that a crime was committed"
and "reasonable suspicion" as requiring "satisfactory grounds for
suspecting that a crime was committed," and suggested that
"[tlhe difference between these two standards is proportionate to
the difference in degree of invasion between
an arrest and a de127
tention, between a full search and a frisk."
Judge Fuld and Judge Van Voorhis dissented. 2 Judge Fuld
argued that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment by
authorizing a search on less than probable cause. 129 Judge Van
Voorhis relied upon his dissent in Sibron, discussed next."'
Sibron had been convicted in New York State court of the
unlawful possession of heroin."1
At a suppression hearing,
Brooklyn patrolman Anthony Martin testified that he was patrolling his beat in uniform and observed Sibron from 4:00 in the
afternoon until midnight, and that Sibron was in conversation
with six to eight people who Martin knew were narcotics addicts.
Sibron entered a restaurant and spoke with three more known
addicts, ordered pie and coffee and was eating when Martin ap-

123

id.

124 Id.

Id. (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964)).
Id. at 600.
127 Id. (stating that such a distinction was "both reasonable
and desirable").
'2
126

128See id. at 601-02.

129
See id. at 601 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's interpretation of
the New York statute was an "outright invitation to evade the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and to circumvent the exclusionary rule").
120 See id. at 602 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
"' See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 44 (1968).
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proached him and asked him to come outside. 132 Once outside,
Martin said to Sibron, "[y]ou know what I am after."133 Sibron
mumbled something and reached into his pocket, and Martin put
his own hand into Sibron's pocket and discovered several glassine envelopes containing heroin. 3 4 The state trial judge denied a
motion to suppress evidence, and the New York Court of Appeals
upheld Sibron's conviction by a 5-2 vote, without an opinion by
the majority.'35
One of the dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Van Voorhis, was willing to assume that Patrolman
Martin reasonably suspected that Sibron was committing or
about to commit a felony within the meaning of the New York
statute.136 He found fault, however, in the scope of Martin's
search and argued that the statute should be limited to discovery
of dangerous weapons concealed upon the person of the suspect
in order to protect the safety of the officer."17 Thus, Judge Van
138
Voorhis would have strictly circumscribed the scope of a frisk.
Judge Fuld relied upon his dissent in Peters.'39
B. The New York Court of Appeals'Argument
Not only did the Court of Appeals uphold the convictions in
Peters and Sibron, but in Peters the court stated that Officer
Lasky "is deserving of our highest praise."4 ° Like Chief Justice
Warren who praised Detective McFadden in Terry, the Court of
Appeals in Peters concluded that the officer did exactly what the
public wanted an officer to do, and that in the process he protected himself as he well should have.
The Court of Appeals warned in Peters of the consequences
of applying a single probable cause standard to all police conduct: "The attempt to apply a single standard of probable cause
to all interferences-i.e., to treat a stop as an arrest and a frisk
132See

id. at 45.

133 Id.

134See id.
"s See People v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1966) (mem.), rev'd, 392 U.S. 40
(1968).
136See id. at 197 (Van Voorhis J., dissenting).
137See id.
138 See

id. at 199.
See id. at 197. (Fuld, J., dissenting).
14 Peters, 219 N.E.2d at
599.
141 See id.
139

934
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as a search-produces a standard either so strict that reasonable
and necessary police work becomes unlawful or so diluted that
the individual is not adequately protected." The Court went on
to conclude that "[t]he doctrine of 'stop and frisk upon reasonable
suspicion' does not produce unreasonable searches and seizures.
It gives effect to the principle that the grounds for a stop should
be reasonable in light of the degree of interference it represents."'
C. Supreme Court Review
Peters and Sibron are discussed together in a single opinion
authored by Chief Justice Warren. 44 4The
Chief Justice chose to
5
discuss Sibron first and Peters second.

According to the Chief Justice, the state trial judge denied
Sibron's motion to suppress heroin without relying on a stop and
frisk analysis.4 6 The judge found probable cause for Patrolman
47
Martin to arrest Sibron and to search him incident to arrest.
He pointed out, as I have, that the Court of Appeals' majority
wrote no opinion in affirming the conviction. 148 The state relied
upon the stop and frisk statute in the Supreme Court, and attempted to confess error after the Court noted probable jurisdiction in the case.4 9 Apparently, the state was persuaded that Sibron's conviction was invalidly obtained and that the search that
produced the heroin was illegal. The Supreme Court declined to
accept the confession of error, however, and decided to reach the
merits. 5 '
Although the parties in both Sibron and Peters argued that
the Court should address the constitutionality of the New York
stop and frisk statute on its face, Chief Justice Warren's opinion
explicitly rejected these arguments on the ground that "[t]he
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently
the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete
142 Id.

at 600.

143 id.

See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
145
See id. at 44.
14

146 See id. at 47.
147 See

id.

See supra text accompanying note 135.
. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 47-48.
0lSee id. at 58-59. Justice Fortas would have accepted the confession of error,
as he indicated in his concurring opinion. See id. at 70 (Fortas, J., concurring).
"8
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factual context of the individual case."15' Chief Justice Warren
observed that the names which New York chose to apply to police conduct would not be determinative of Fourth Amendment
validity, nor would the Fourth Amendment issue turn on
whether police conduct was authorized by state law. The Chief
Justice observed that some stops authorized by statute might not
even constitute seizures while others might be justified as arrests, and thus emphasized that a statute on its face may appear
to authorize an array of conduct which must be examined on a
case by case basis."'
Looking at the facts of Sibron, the Chief Justice avoided the
question whether Sibron had been seized at any point before Patrolman Martin physically grabbed him and reached into his
pocket. Thus, the Court avoided having to decide whether there
was a reasonable basis for a detention for purposes of investigation based upon Martin's observations.'53 Chief Justice Warren
leaped beyond the detention issue to criticize the New York
Court of Appeals for treating Martin's search as a self-protective
search for weapons. 54 Chief Justice Warren recognized in his
opinion that the state trial judge apparently upheld the search
as incident to arrest and never reached the question of the applicability of the stop and frisk statute. 5 5 Ironically, the Chief Justice insisted that the Court of Appeals affirmed on a different
basis. This assumption is questionable even though the dissent
by Judge Van Voorhis discussed the stop and frisk statute, and
stated that the State did not contend on appeal that there was
probable cause to make an arrest.

56

It is quite possible that the

majority of the Court of Appeals simply affirmed the trial judge's
finding of probable cause, even though this might have been error. Neither Chief Justice Warren nor Judge Van Voorhis disclosed what Sibron's counsel argued. The other possibility is
that counsel failed to raise a specific challenge to the way in
151Id. at 59.
'52

See id. at 60 n.20.

' See id. at 72 (addressing the stop in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
concluded that the encounter between Patrolman Martin and Sibron did not meet
the Terry standard; therefore, there was an absence of reasonable grounds to intrude forcibly upon Sibron).
14 See id. at 63-64 & n.21.
'6 See id. at 46-47 n.4, 64 n.21.
'5s
See People v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196, 197 (N.Y. 1966) (mem.) (Van Voorhis,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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which the New York statute was applied to Sibron. These are
more than idle possibilities, given the limits that the Court of
Appeals placed upon both stops, and especially frisks in Peters,
as discussed above.
It is relatively easy for the Chief Justice to have concluded
that, even assuming that there were adequate grounds for Martin to frisk Sibron, "[tihe search was not reasonably limited in
scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection of the officer
by disarming a potentially dangerous man."157 This conclusion is
totally consistent both with the New York Court of Appeals' reasoning in Peters, and with the State's attempt to confess error in
the case.
Justice Black, who agreed with the Court that the state's
confession of error should be rejected, argued that "there was
probable cause for the policeman to believe that when Sibron
reached his hand to his coat pocket, Sibron had a dangerous
weapon which he might use if it were not taken away from
him."'58 Justice Black appeared to have misunderstood the Chief
Justice's reasoning, since Justice Black wrote that the Court
seems to have determined that the New York Court of Appeals
used this rationale to affirm the conviction and to hold that the
officer reasonably suspected he was in danger of life or limb. As
explained above, no one can be sure what the Court of Appeals
reasoning was, but it is virtually certain that no one argued that
Martin had probable cause to arrest Sibron for concealing a dangerous weapon, since that argument is not mentioned anywhere
except in Justice Black's opinion and is unsupported by any citation to the record. If the state trial judge had found as a matter of fact that Martin had probable cause to arrest for a weapons charge rather than a drug charge, the search would have
been incident to arrest, not pursuant to the stop and frisk statute. If the state trial judge had made such a finding, he would
also have had to determine whether Sibron had been seized by
Martin before Martin developed his probable cause and whether
the seizure was valid. Justice Black accused the majority of
choosing "to draw inferences different from mine and those
drawn by the courts below,"'59 but it appears that Justice Black
1' Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65.
"1

Id. at 80 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).

1'9 Id. at 81.
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offered a rationale for the officer's conduct that was not considered below and that could not be adopted without consideration
of the seizure issue which he ignored.
The ultimate irony of Sibron in the Supreme Court is that
Justice Black chastised the majority for acting upon its own
findings and substituting itself for the lower state courts when
the state itself represented that there had been error below and
it was almost impossible to know exactly what the state courts
had done. Moreover, there was no indication that any state
court judge or prosecutors in the case had relied upon the reasoning which Justice Black settled upon in his opinion.
It is apparent that Chief Justice Warren worked hard to
avoid deciding when police may forcibly detain a person for investigation, as opposed to when they may frisk a person. Despite
the careful opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Peters,
the Chief Justice's opinion for the Supreme Court was that Officer Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters when he first encountered him on the stairway and that the search was therefore
a valid search incident to the arrest.' This reasoning appears to
be strained. Had Lasky discovered nothing as a result of his
conversation with Peters, and had the frisk uncovered nothing, it
is doubtful that many courts would say that there was probable
cause to arrest. Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Warren offered
no clue as to what Peters would have been charged with prior to
being discovered with the burglar tools.
Justice White joined the Court's opinion except for the reasoning about arrest. He joined the Court in affirming Peters's
conviction "not because there was probable cause to arrest, a
question I do not reach, but because there was probable cause to
stop Peters for questioning and thus to frisk him for dangerous
weapons." 6'
Justice Harlan disagreed in his opinion concurring in the result with the Court's analysis of probable cause, and persuasively argued that "if probable cause existed here, I find it difficult to see why a different rationale was necessary to support the
stop and frisk in Terry and why States such as New York have
had to devote so much thought to the constitutional problems of
'60

See id. at 66.

'61Id. at 69 (White, J., concurring). Justice White cited his concurring opinion in
Terry. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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field interrogation.",1 2 Justice Harlan would have affirmed the
conviction "on the Terry ground that Officer Lasky had reasonable cause to make a forced stop."'63 Thus, Justice Harlan specifically addressed the forcible stop issue the Chief Justice
struggled to avoid.
Justice Harlan agreed that it made little sense for the Court
to pass upon the constitutionality of the New York statute on its
face, but he also would not have ignored the statute. Since New
York took pains to deal with the issue of on-the-street police
work, Justice Harlan opined that the Court ought to indicate the
level of New York's success. For Justice Harlan, "[t]he core of
the New York statute is the permission to stop any person reasonably suspected of crime," and "[ujnder the decision in Terry a
right to stop may indeed be premised on reasonable suspicion
and does not require probable cause, and hence the New York
formulation is to that extent constitutional."' 64
Justice Harlan equated the terms reasonable cause and reasonable suspicion at times in his opinion and emphasized that
reasonable suspicion can justify a stop when an incipient crime
is being investigated whereas probable cause requires a degree of
likelihood that a crime already has been committed.'6 5 He suggested that "where immediate action is obviously required, a police officer is justified in acting on rather less objectively articuis more time for consideration of
lable evidence than when there
166
alternative courses of action."
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFTER TERRY
A. The Absence of a ClearRule
Although it is impossible to know for certain what any four
or more justices of the Supreme Court were thinking in 1967, it
appears reasonable to conclude that the Court noted probable
jurisdiction in Peters and Sibron because the New York statute
raised an important constitutional issue which the Court wanted
to decide, and that the Court also granted review in Terry to
compare the nonstatutory approach of Ohio to the statutory ap1"2Sibron, 392
"'

U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Id. at 77-78.

'"Id. at 71.
"'

See id. at 78.

166Id.
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proach of New York. Whatever the Court was thinking when it
set the three cases for argument, at some point a majority decided that it wanted to avoid announcing a clear rule that would
apply to all forcible police stops or seizures of a person without
probable cause. Chief Justice Warren criticized the New York
Court of Appeals in Sibron without knowing for sure what the
basis of the court's decision was in that case, and rejected a confession of error by the state notwithstanding the lack of clarity in
the record as the grounds for the decision below. The Chief Justice strained in Peters to turn an investigative stop into an arrest
in order not to approve the application of the New York statute
to the facts, even though Officer Lasky's actions were as reasonable and perhaps more necessary than the actions of Detective
McFadden in Terry. In Terry, the Chief Justice worked hard to
leap over the issue of whether, and on what basis, a police officer
may forcibly stop a person to investigate in order to make the
case seem like nothing more than an immediate frisk case, and
stated the holding of the Court in the narrow terms explored in
detail above.
Today, we readily refer to the Terry doctrine as a reasonable
suspicion rule, but it was hardly clear that a majority of the
Court approved such a rule in 1968. By the end of the 1967
term, the Court had no clear standard for investigative stops. It
had, however, planted all the seeds for what the Terry doctrine
would eventually become.
B. One More Case
A week to the day after announcing the opinions in Terry,
Sibron, and Peters, the Court dismissed as improvidently
granted the writ of certiorari in Wainwright v. New Orleans.167
The case is interesting because it demonstrates that the Court
had not yet grasped the possible significance of the opinions rendered the previous week.
Stephen Wainwright was a Tulane University law student in
1964 when he was observed by New Orleans police as fitting the
description of a man wanted for murder. The police stopped
their cruiser and detained Wainwright, apparently telling him
why. The suspect whom the police sought had a tattoo on his left
forearm with the words "born to raise hell." The police asked
'6

392 U.S. 598 (1968).
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Wainwright, who had no identification (apparently he had left it
at home), to remove his jacket so that could examine his left
forearm. Wainwright refused, although he did not disclose at
the time that he was suffering from an unsightly skin ailment.
Wainwright attempted three times to walk away from the police,
twice before they placed him under arrest for vagrancy. Ultimately, Wainwright was convicted of resisting arrest and assault, but the conviction was overturned on appeal.
Chief Justice Warren dissented from the dismissal of the
writ of certiorari and argued that the arrest was unlawful and
the conviction could not stand. He offered one view of the facts
of the case. Justice Douglas also dissented and offered another
view, suggesting that the officers removed Wainwright to the
police station solely to be able to determine whether he matched
the tattoo."6 8 Justice Douglas concluded that the police "seized"
Wainwright to question him about the murder, and reasoned
that "[tihe circumstances of this case show that the arrest was
no more than arrest on suspicion, which of course was unconstitutional-at least prior to Terry-and robs the search of any
color of legality."" 9 Justice Douglas argued that the police had
no right to "seize" Wainwright, and that the case pointed up the
dangers of Terry."0

It is significant that Chief Justice Warren did not even address the question of what police officers may do when they confront someone who matches the description of a murderer. May
they detain him? May they question him? May they seek a
physical identification by looking at his arm? For the Chief Justice it was clear that the arrest and search were illegal and the
state courts "rejected possibly meritorious [defenses] on the erroneous premise that the search was lawful." 7 ' But, Justice For-

tas and Justice Marshall, who did not participate in Terry, were
"not prepared to say that, regardless of the presence or absence
of adequate cause for police action, the arrest or the attempt by
the officers to search is unlawful.., where the accosted person
produces no identification, attempts three times to walk away,
and refuses to dispel any doubt by showing that his forearm is

'68

See id. at 610 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

'69Id.

at 613 (citations omitted).

170Id.

'7' Id. at 603 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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not tattooed."172
Wainwright was a signal to the Court that the Terry opinion
was only the first step in defining the permissible scope of forcible police encounters with citizens on the street. The Chief Justice deliberately avoided the issue of when a forcible stop for
questioning may occur in his opinions in Terry, Sibron and Peters. When he addressed the Wainwright case a week after those
decisions were announced, his confidence that the police had
acted wrongly was not widely shared among the justices.
V. ADAMS V. WILLIAMS-THE NEXT STEP

A. The Facts
The Supreme Court of Connecticut stated the facts State v.
Williams73 as follows: At 2:15 a.m. on a Sunday morning, Sergeant John Connolly of the Bridgeport Police Department was
patrolling alone in a high crime area when he was approached by
a man he knew and regarded as trustworthy. This man told him
that a person seated in a vehicle on the other side of the street
was armed with a pistol at his waist and had narcotics in his
possession. Sergeant Connolly approached the vehicle, tapped
on the window and told the occupant, Robert Williams, to open
the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, Connolly reached into the car and removed a fully loaded pistol from
the defendant's waistband. He then arrested the defendant. A
subsequent search revealed that Williams had heroin on his person, a machete in the car under the front seat, and a second revolver in the trunk.
B. The Lower Courts
The Connecticut Supreme Court found that Connolly acted
properly under Terry."' Williams sought federal habeas corpus
relief which was denied in the District Court of Connecticut. A
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial,'75 but the vote was 2-1 and the dissenting opinion of the distinguished jurist Henry Friendly proved in
172

Id. at 599 (Fortas, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring).

249 A.2d 245, 246 (Conn. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969).
See id. at 247.
175See Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on reh'g en
banc per
'73

'74

curiam,441 F.2d 30 (1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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the end to be persuasive to his fellow judges. The panel decision
of the Court of Appeals was reversed by a rare en banc per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals.'76
Judge Friendly seemed to reason as follows: (1) Connecticut
permits citizens to carry firearms, even concealed weapons, and
does not authorize officers to routinely frisk for weapons; (2)
Therefore, a tip that a person was carrying a firearm is not necessarily a tip about a criminal act or one that shows that crime is
afoot; (3) An unsubstantiated tip that a person has narcotics
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion; (4) If (1), (2), and (3)
are correct, then an unsubstantiated tip that a person has a gun
and narcotics still does not give rise to reasonable suspicion,
since the gun remains potentially lawful and the narcotics tip
remains uncorroborated; (5) There is a danger that police will focus on the gun, even in a state where it is lawful to carry it, to do
a frisk which is a subterfuge for a narcotics search.'77
C. The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction of Williams in its first look at Terry since
the case was decided.'78 Then Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority of the Court that "[iun Terry this Court recognized that 'a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable
cause to make an arrest.' ""' Justice Rehnquist added that "[a]

brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the
8
He also noted that
facts known to the officer at the time.""'
Terry permitted an officer to protect himself against attack.'
He applied the Terry principles to the facts of this case and concluded that "Sgt. Connolly acted justifiably in responding to his
informant's tip."'8 2 The opinion rejected Williams's argument
,76
See Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (per curiam),
rev'd, 40 U.S. 143 (1972).
'77See Williams, 436 F.2d at 37-38.

See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Id. at 145 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
'' Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).
,8'See id.
178

179

182 Id.
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that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on
an officer's direct observations rather than on information provided by others, and reasoned that some tips may be reliable and
may form the basis for a stop and frisk while other tips may require further investigation before a forcible stop or a suspect
would be authorized."i
The Williams opinion more explicitly recognizes the power to
forcibly stop for investigatory purposes than Terry did. It followed the lead of Terry regarding frisks by finding that Connolly
acted properly in making a limited intrusion to protect his
safety.
Three separate dissents were filed. Justice Douglas, joined
by Justice Marshall, dissented on the ground that there was no
basis to arrest Williams for possession of a gun when Connecticut permitted its citizens to carry concealed weapons.1" Justice
Brennan relied upon Circuit Judge Friendly's dissent from the
panel decision,1" and concluded that the tip did not give rise to
reasonable cause to support the intrusion. Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Douglas, appeared to join Justice Rehnquist in
concluding that Terry, which had largely ducked the investigatory stop issue, "explicitly recognized the concept of 'stop and
frisk' and squarely held that police officers may, under appropriate circumstances, stop and frisk persons suspected of criminal
activity even though there is less than probable cause for an ar"' Justice Marshall emphasized that the facts were similar
rest."86
to Terry because the decision to frisk was made virtually immediately after the officer encountered the suspect, but distinguished Williams from Terry on the basis of the tipster's failure
to explain how he came about any of his information.1 87 Justice
Marshall, like Justice Douglas, questioned whether the tip established that the suspect was armed and dangerous when the
state permitted its citizens to carry weapons, concealed or otherwise."'8

'3
184

See id. at 147.
See id. at 149-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

18.See

Williams, 436 F.2d at 38-39 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
""Adams, 407 U.S. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187 See id. at 155-59.
18 See id. at 159-60. Justice Marshall also questioned whether Connolly had
probable cause to arrest for possession of a gun without any information about
whether it was possessed lawfully or unlawfully, and called "[amny implication that
respondent's silence was some sort of a tacit admission of guilt... utterly absurd."

944
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D. The Evolving Standard
Adams v. Williams did more than reiterate Terry. It seemed
to bolster the "investigatory stop" part of stop and frisk and continue Chief Justice Warren's approach of taking a common sense
approach to law enforcement. The Court was willing to permit
Sergeant Connolly to consider the area in which the car was located, the time of the morning, the absence of any legitimate
explanation for the car's presence, and his familiarity with the
tipster in deciding that he should intervene and confront the
suspect. The Court also reflected its understanding that no police officer could be expected to approach a suspect who is supposed to be armed and who may be involved with narcotics without checking for weapons.
Judge Friendly noted in his dissent from the panel decision
that in his view the threshold issue a court must confront is
whether an officer had the right to insist on an encounter, i.e.,
"to make a forcible stop."18 9 Judge Friendly observed that "I do
not read the Chief Justice's opinion as holding otherwise, although as Mr. Justice Harlan indicated,.., the thought may not
have been 'fully expressed.' ""' Of course, the Chief Justice's
Terry opinion did not hold otherwise; it avoided holding anything
at all. But, in Williams, the Court as a whole addresses the
threshold issue and the 6-3 split is whether Connolly should
have taken the first step, or made a stop. With a little help from
Judge Friendly's interpolation of the Harlan analysis into the
Warren opinion, the Supreme Court in Williams made clear that
a stop and frisk requires two justifications and that the Harlan
analysis would become the legacy of Terry."'
VI. TRANSFORMATION COMPLETE
92
A. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen holding a valid United
States work permit, was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing and facilitating the transportation of a large quantity of
Id. at 160-61.
" Williams, 436 F.2d at 35 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).

'90
Id. at 35 n.2.
'9'
See Adams, 407 U.S. at 148.
"2

413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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illegally imported marijuana. He contended that the search of
his automobile that uncovered the marijuana was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 193 The government did not dispute Almeida-Sanchez's claim that the Border Patrol had no search
warrant, and that there was no probable cause of any kind for
the stop of his car or the subsequent search."'
Instead, the government claimed that it acted reasonably in
an effort to detect illegal aliens.' 9 Justice Stewart's opinion for
the Court observed that the Border Patrol conducts three types
of surveillance along inland roadways. First, it maintains permanent checkpoints at certain nodal intersections; next, temporary checkpoints are established from time to time at various
places; and finally, there are roving patrols such as the one that
stopped and searched Almeida-Sanchez's car. 98 The government
argued that, in all of these operations, its agents are acting
within the Constitution when they stop and search automobiles
without a warrant, without probable cause to believe the cars
contain aliens, and even without probable cause to believe the
cars have made a border crossing.'97 The government relied upon
§ 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,9 8 which provided for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary
of the United States,' as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General," and upon the Attorney General's
regulation,'9 9 which "defines 'reasonable distance' as 'within 00100
air miles from any external boundary of the United States. ,
Justice Stewart's opinion stated that "not even the
'reasonable suspicion' found sufficient for a street detention and
weapons search in Terry v. Ohio... and Adams v. Williams" was
2 1
requiredY.
Ultimately, the Court held, 5-4, that roving searches
without probable cause were impermissible. 2 But, the decision
had clearly referred to Terry and Adams as reasonable suspicion
193

1

See id. at 267.
See id. at 268.

193See id.
lea See id.
197See id.
"'

199

20

Ch. 9, § 287, 66 Stat. 233 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1994)).
8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1998).
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.

201 Id.

20

See id. at 273-75.
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cases, notwithstanding the failure of the author of either opinion
to use a reasonable suspicion standard explicitly.
B. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce"3
This case arose after Almeida-Sanchez and involved a Border Patrol claim that they could stop a car and question its occupants as part of its effort to thwart the illegal immigration of aliens. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court correctly noted that,
in Terry, "the Court declined expressly to decide whether facts
not amounting to probable cause could justify an 'investigative
"seizure" ' short of an arrest."" 4 Justice Powell also noted that
the Court had "elaborated" on Terry in Adams v. Williams,
"holding that a policeman was justified in approaching the respondent
to investigate a tip that he was carrying narcotics and
20 5
a gun."
Putting the two cases together, Justice Powell concluded
that they "establish that in appropriate circumstances the
Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited 'search' or 'seizure'
on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to
0 6 He reasoned that
search for contraband or evidence of crime.""
"[t]he limited searches and seizures in those cases were a valid
method of protecting the public and preventing crime," and:
In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a
brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for
policing the border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. 7
Justice Powell relied upon Terry for the proposition that the
stop and inquiry must be " 'reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation,' " so that an immigration officer
"may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship
and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be
203

422 U.S. 873 (1975).

Id. at 880 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
Id. at 880-81.
200 Id. at 881.
214
205

207

Id.
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based on consent or probable cause. " "'
The Court once again equated Terry with reasonable suspicion. Border search cases were the vehicle the Court used to
elaborate upon Terry.
C. New York v. Earl 9
In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in a case in which
the New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction, 210

Chief

Justice Burger stated his understanding of Terry: "Terry establishes a two-pronged test for determining the propriety of this
type of conduct: '[1] whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and [2] whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.' ,,211 The Chief Justice equated justification at its inception
with reasonable suspicion.212 He did not elaborate on the standard nor did he indicate that he felt it needed explanation.
213

D. Ybarra v. Illinois

In this case, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court found
unconstitutional an Illinois statute giving law enforcement the
authority to detain and search all persons present when a search
warrant is issued. Ybarra was a customer in a tavern when police arrived with a search warrant to search the tavern and the
bartender. The police searched Ybarra and found narcotics. The
Court found that all patrons of the tavern were cloaked with the
constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment and there
was no probable cause to search them.214 It rejected the state's
argument that the search was a permissible frisk, reasoning that
"[tihe Terry case created an exception to the requirement of
probable cause, an exception whose 'narrow scope' this Court
has been careful to maintain.' ,215 Justice Stewart emphasized
211Id. at 881-82

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).

209 431 U.S. 943 (1977).
210 See People v. Earl, 358 N.E.2d 1037 (N.Y. 1976) (mem.), cert. denied 431 U.S.

943 (1977).
21 Earl, 431 U.S. at 945-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20) (alterations in original).
212 See id. at 946.
213 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
214 See id. at 91-92 (limiting the application of the search warrant to the place
andpersons specified in the warrant itself).
15Id. at 93 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
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that "[niothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized
'cursory search for weapons' or indeed, any search whatever for
anything but weapons."216 As for the standard to be employed,
Justice Stewart wrote that "[the 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even
though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place."217 Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
18

2
E. Delaware v. Prouse

Finally, in 1979, the Supreme Court held that the reasonable suspicion rule it had applied to roving border searches to
limit stops of automobiles applied more generally to all automobile stops. In Prouse, Justice White framed the question as
follows:
The question is whether it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to stop an
automobile, being driven on a public highway, for the
purpose of checking the driving license of the operator
and the registration of the car, where there is neither
probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that
the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the
operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of
its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any other applicable law.1 9
Justice White cited United States v. Brignoni-Ponce220 as
having "analogized the roving-patrol stop to the on-the-street encounter addressed in Terry v. Ohio."22 ' The Court rejected Delaware's argument that its interest in enforcing traffic laws and license and registration requirements justified a random stop
without cause.2
Justice White wrote that "[t]o insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular autoId. at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
218 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
219 Id. at 650.
216
217

220 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). For a discussion of Brignoni-Ponce,see supra notes
203-08 and accompanying text.
221 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655.
222

See id.
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mobile nor upon some other substantial and objective standard
or rule to govern the exercise of discretion 'would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches .... ' "
Of course,
the quote is from Terry. Justice White explained how the imposition of a standard like reasonable suspicion protects against
abuse of discretion by law enforcement officers:
When there is not probable cause to believe that a driver
is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic
and equipment regulations-or other articulable basis
amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered-we cannot conceive of
any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman could decide
that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be
more productive than stopping any other driver. This
kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the
evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has
insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent.m
Justice White relied upon Terry for the proposition that just
as "people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection
when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor
are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles."
Justice White concludes his opinion by stating the Court's
holding as follows:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license
and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.226

21 Id. at 661 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
224

Id. (citing inter alia Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270

(1973)) (footnote omitted).
22 Id. at 663.
216 Id. The Court left open the possibility that Delaware and
other states might
constrain the exercise of discretion in other ways, such as roadblocks at which all
drivers are asked for licenses and registrations. See id.
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F. Dunaway v. New York22 and Brown v. Texas22 8
Three months after announcing Delaware v. Prouse, the
Court held in Dunaway v. New York that a police officer violated
the Fourth Amendment when he removed defendant Dunaway to
the station house without probable cause and interrogated
him.229 Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court described Terry
as the case that "for the first time recognized an exception to the
requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must
be based on probable cause," and as the case "[that... involved
a brief, on-the-spot stop on the street and a frisk for weapons, a
situation that did not fit comfortably within the traditional concept of an 'arrest.' ,21o According to Justice Brennan:
Terry departed from traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis in two respects. First, it defined a special category of Fourth Amendment 'seizures' so substantially less
intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring
probable cause to make Fourth Amendment 'seizures'
reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. Second,
the application of this balancing test led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on
grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for
the purpose of a pat-down for weapons."'
Thus, Justice Brennan described Terry as a case that involved both a stop and then a frisk.2 2
In Brown, Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court as it held
that officers "seized" Brown when they detained him for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, and that they lacked
reasonable suspicion to support their seizure. 2" The Chief Justice cited Dunaway, Terry, Brignoni-Ponce, and Prouse in his
opinion.' He described the purport of these cases as follows:
A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an
227 442

U.S. 200 (1979).

28 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
229

See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 207.

2" Id. at 208-09.
2-1Id. at 209-10.
22Justice Brennan did observe that the Terry Court did not actually decide
whether a person could be stopped and seized for purposes of interrogation. See id.
at 210 n.12.
'3 Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-52.
234 See id.
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individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. To this end, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on
specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual,
or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers." 5
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[t]he Texas statute under which appellant was stopped and required to identify himself
is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large metropolitan centers: prevention of crime," but his opinion goes on to
hold that, "even assuming that purpose is served to some degree
by stopping and demanding identification from an individual
without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal
activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow
it." 6 The Court found that it was insufficient that an officer
testified that the situation involving Brown "looked suspicious"
when the officer could recall no facts supporting the conclusion."
G. The State of the Law
By the end of the Court's 1978 Term, it had extended Terry
to automobile stops generally, and had recognized that Terry established a reasonable suspicion standard for stops amounting to
seizures and permitted a limited frisk for weapons when an officer reasonably had safety concerns. The Court never explicitly
stated that, in adopting the reasonable suspicion standard, it
was going beyond the holding of Terry and approving the standard that Chief Justice Warren had worked hard to avoid in his
opinion. Reasonable suspicion was a metamorphosis of Terry. It
occurred over time without complaint from any Justice.
Thus, the Terry rule that I regard as practically perfect had
clearly been established in 1979. It is a rule that requires an officer making a forcible intrusion upon a suspect to have reasonable suspicion, as Justice Harlan proposed and Justice White
seemed to accept in Terry; reasonable suspicion must be based
upon specific articulable facts, as Chief Justice Warren insisted
23"Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
236

Id. at 52.

237 id.
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upon in Terry; and the reasonable suspicion must be that criminal activity has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, as
Justice Harlan articulated in Terry.
The Court had less occasion from 1968 to 1979 to develop the
"frisk" rule first articulated in Terry and relied upon in Adams v.
Williams." 8 But, it consistently reiterated that the frisk permitted by Terry is a limited search permitted to protect public safety
and is confined to weapons.
This developed notion of stop and frisk is what I hereinafter
refer to as the Terry rule.
VII. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF TERRY STOPS
A. Why Stop?
The common sense of Terry is that law enforcement officers
should not be required to wait to act until a crime is complete,
whereby society suffers a criminal injury, if they have reasonable
grounds to suspect that criminal activity is under way and the
ability to establish quickly whether their suspicion is correct.
Most Terry stops can be understood as "freezing the scene" so
that an officer can make a determination as to whether probable
cause to arrest or search exists, or whether some other permissible action should be taken. A Terry stop enables the police to
ascertain whether what looks like criminal activity, actually is.
As a result of Terry, officers are not compelled to make a Hobson's choice between waiting for suspicious activity to play out in
terms of completed crimes, and prematurely intervening to arrest suspects who may be innocent. Terry permits an intermediate approach in which officers can avail themselves of reasonable
suspicion, check out facts, and determine whether or not activity
is criminal.
Of course, a Terry stop involves more than a police officer
simply saying "freeze" or "halt" and then, once everyone has
stopped, deciding whether or not the scene is criminal. In order
to understand events, the officer may ask questions and use reasonable force to keep things under control until the stop ends either in arrest or in release of the persons stopped. This explains
why the Supreme Court has indicated that the Miranda v. Ari-

28

407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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zona 239 rule requiring warnings for suspects undergoing custodial
interrogation does not apply to Terry stops.20 Since the purpose
of a Terry stop is to enable an officer to gather sufficient information to know whether to arrest or release a suspect, the Court
clearly does not want to impose roadblocks to reasonable information gathering.
B. Common Sense of Terry Stops
The Supreme Court appears to have agreed with many state
courts that nothing in the Fourth Amendment absolutely bars
law enforcement officers from acting until a crime is over and
harm has occurred. The Court's approach represents common
sense. It would require either clear language or an incredibly
rich legislative history to convince most judges or any lay person
that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent a police officer, who had reasonable suspicion that a suspect was carrying
a bomb into the World Trade Center, from taking steps to determine whether his suspicion was correct, unless the suspect
consented or the bomb was detonated so that a crime was complete. The facts of Terry are less compelling, of course. And the
facts of Adams v. Williams are less compelling yet. But, the
common sense remains the same. Law enforcement officers
must have power to prevent crimes before they occur when they
can do so with a brief and limited intrusion into a suspect's liberty.
C. Workability of the Terry Standard
The New York Court of Appeals claimed in People v. Peters
that reasonable suspicion was a familiar term and that it would
prove no more difficult to employ than probable cause. 241 Experience under Terry has proved that the Court of Appeals was correct.
It is interesting to observe that the same Congress that pro-

23 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that persons

240

who are subject to ordinary traffic stops "are not in custody' for the purposes of Miranda").
241See People v. Peters, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599 (N.Y. 1966), af/d sub nom., Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (stating that courts have given the terms
"suspicion" and "reasonable suspicion" definite meaning, falling "somewhat below
probable cause on the scale of absolute knowledge of criminal activity").
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posed the Bill of Rights to the states had, two months earlier,
enacted the first customs statute which "granted customs officials 'full power and authority' to enter and search 'any ship or
vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
"
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed .....
Although the Supreme Court has considered the statute as evidence that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to border
searches, 3 the statute is better evidence from the dawning of
the Nation that there has been an understanding that some intrusions involving searches can be justified on a reasonable suspicion standard. More importantly, the Supreme Court has
never found it necessary to attempt to state probable cause in
mathematical terms, and we have dealt with the term since the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. Probable cause is a judgment
call based upon the totality of the circumstances,"' and even
though there is most always some probability of criminal activity, however small, associated with events, courts have been able
to make probable cause a meaningful term. This does not mean
that all judges agree in all cases. But there is a substantial body
of agreement on when probable cause does or does not exist in
many familiar circumstances.
This is also true of reasonable suspicion. Justice White concluded in Peters that there was probable cause to stop Peters for
questioning.245 He apparently meant that there was a sufficient
probability that crime was afoot that Peters could be stopped so
that the officer could decide whether there was probable cause to
arrest. Most courts applying Terry seem to use a similar analysis, often implicit, that Terry cause to stop exists when an officer
has sufficient articulable facts to suspect that a crime may be occurring, may have occurred, or may be about to occur, and that a
forcible police intrusion in the form of a stop will provide the officer with an opportunity to decide whether suspicion is confirmed
or assuaged. Some courts speak of a reasonable possibility as
opposed to a reasonable probability of criminal activity, and I
242United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (quoting Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29).
243 See id. at 617-18.
24 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41 (1983). Even Spinelli v. United

States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), which Gates overrules, recognized that probable
cause requires only "the probability" of criminal activity, which the Court said was
less than a prima facie showing.
245See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring).
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have joined in the suggestion that "[rleasonable suspicion can be
usefully referred to as 'possible cause.' ,,26 The precise words are

not as important as the relatively uniform approach which has
remained constant since Terry.
Chief Justice Warren in Terry emphasized the importance of
specific facts known to the police. Chief Justice Burger, in
United States v. Cortez, 7 carried forward this emphasis:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to
stop a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and
"founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall short of
providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual
situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been
written is that the totality of the circumstances-the
whole picture-must be taken into account. Based upon
that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must
yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements,
each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective
observations, information from police reports, if such are
available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of
operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these
data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might well
elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities
was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so
are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement.
The second element contained in the idea that an as246

SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 39, at 193.
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449 U.S. 411 (1981).
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sessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized
suspicion is the concept that the process just described
must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio,... said that,
"[tihis demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated is the central teaching of
this Court's FourthAmendment jurisprudence."8
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the quantum
and reliability of required evidence for reasonable suspicion is
less than that for probable cause. In Alabama v. White,249 Justice
White's opinion for the Court observed that an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, which were key under the probable
cause standard of Spinelli v. United States,21' remained important under the probable cause standard adopted in Illinois v.
Gates,"' and "are also relevant in the reasonable-suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying them for the
lesser showing required to meet that standard." 2
Justice White explained the different relationship between
evidence amounting to probable cause and that amounting to
reasonable suspicion as follows:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable
than that required to show probable cause. Adams v. Williams ...demonstrates as much. We there assumed that
the unverified tip from the known informant might not
have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but
nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a
Terry stop. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is
dependent upon both the content of information possessed
by police and its degree of reliability. Both factorsquantity and quality-are considered in the "totality of
the circumstances-the whole picture," that must be
248 Id.

at 417-18 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968)) (alteration in

original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
249 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
m 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969).
25 462 U.S. 213, 230-46 (1983).
252 White, 496 U.S. at 328-29.
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taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be
required if the tip were more reliable. 3
There were three dissenters in White, and this serves as a
reminder that the standard may be agreed upon while application of it will not always be unanimous. Nonetheless, reasonable
suspicion has proved to be a workable yardstick for police and
has assured that the police must have specific facts to justify any
forcible encounters with the public.
The Supreme Court rejected an absolute time limit for Terry
stops in United States v. Sharpe. 4 But, the Court also indicated
that a Terry stop is intended to be a brief detention, not a prolonged encounter. Thus, in United States v. Place, 5 Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court that "the brevity of the invasion of
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important
factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion." 6 She observed
that the Court had never upheld a seizure for as long as 90 minutes and signaled that the Court was unhappy with police encounters that involved unreasonable delay."
D. Extension of Terry to Property
Just two years after Terry, Justice Douglas, the sole Terry
dissenter, wrote for a unanimous Court in United States v. Van
Leeuwen"5 as it held that officers, acting upon reasonable suspicion, properly detained a mailed package for more than a day
while an investigation was made for purposes of developing
probable cause and obtaining a warrant.29 Justice Douglas
stated:
The rule of our decisions certainly is not that first-class
mail can be detained 29 hours after mailing in order to
obtain the search warrant needed for its inspec2 Id. at 330 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1981)).
254 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
2- 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
216 Id. at 709.
257

See id. at 709-10.
397 U.S. 249 (1970).

259 See id.

-
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tion... [but] on the facts of this case-the nature of the
mailings, their suspicious character, the fact that there
were two packages going to separate destinations, the
unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant of the
two destinations, the distance between Mt. Vernon and
Seattle-a 29-hour delay between the mailings and the
service of the warrant cannot be said to be "unreasonable"
260
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Douglas added that "[dletention for this limited time
was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages
enter the mails and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying to locate them en route and enlisting
the help of
261
distant federal officials in serving the warrant."
The Court in United States v. Place 62 accepted

the

"reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless
seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on the
basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose of pursuing a
limited course of investigation, short of opening the luggage, that
would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion."262
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court agreed with the government's argument that, "where the authorities possess specific
and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in
seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial."26

The Court concluded that the same interest in pre-

venting crime that undergirded Terry supported a brief Terry
seizure of luggage.2
As noted above, the Court found that the detention was excessive in Place. But, the basic idea is sound that the reasoning
of Terry also supports a brief detention of property while a decision is made whether probable cause exists that would justify
the property being searched without a warrant or seized while a
warrant is sought.

260
261

262

Id. at 253.

Id.
462 U.S. 696 (1983).

Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
215 See id.
263

24

A PRACTICALLY PERFECTDOCTRINE

1998]

E. Long Range Benefit of Terry
266
The New York Court of Appeals warned in People v. Peters
that, without a stop and frisk rule, there would be pressure on
courts to water down the definition of probable cause so that police would be permitted to engage in the common sense law enforcement that Terry now permits.2 7 Terry does much to alleviate this pressure. Indeed, the development of the reasonable
suspicion concept under Terry has clarified and sharpened the
concept of probable cause.
Florida v. Royer 268 illustrates the importance the Court has
placed on distinguishing between reasonable suspicion and probable cause and on limiting the scope of a Terry stop. Royer was
approached by plain-clothes detectives in the Miami International Airport, asked for identification, and questioned.2 69 Justice
White's opinion for a plurality of justices 270 noted that, when the
detectives knew that Royer had paid cash for a one way ticket
and placed a name tag on his luggage which was not his, they
asked for and examined Royer's ticket and driver's license and
discovered he was traveling under an assumed name. The opinion concluded that when they saw Royer become extremely nervous, the detectives had "adequate grounds for suspecting Royer
of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in
a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detention."271' But, Justice White also concluded that when the detectives asked Royer to accompany them to a police room in the
airport while they retained his ticket and seized his luggage,
Terry and its progeny "did not justify the restraint to which

266219 N.E.2d 595 (N.Y. 1966), affd sub nom Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40

(1968).
267

Id.

The attempt to apply a single standard of probable cause to all interferences-i.e., to treat a stop as an arrest and a frisk as a search-produces a
standard either so strict that reasonable and necessary police work becomes unlawful or so diluted that the individual is not adequately protected.
268

460 U.S. 491 (1983).

269

See id. at 494.
Justice White was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens. See id. at

270

493.

See id. at 600.

271Id. at 502.
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Royer was then subjected."272 Thus, the plurality found that a
consent to search his luggage was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 273 Royer emphasizes the importance of fo-

cusing on: (1) the difference between Terry stops and prolonged
detention, (2) the difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and (3) the need to separate when a stop ends
from when something more like an arrest begins.
The Supreme Court has not been alone in insisting that
there is a genuine difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Lower court cases like United States v. Winsor274 make this point as well. Officers chased suspected bank
robbers fleeing from the bank into a hotel.275 The question was
whether there was probable cause to search each of the rooms for
the suspects. The court found that the probability of finding the
bank robbers was too small to support probable cause, but that it
did constitute reasonable suspicion:
The odds on discovering the suspect in the first room
upon whose door the police knocked were high enough to
amount to founded suspicion. The odds favoring discovery
increase as rooms are searched. At some point, perhaps at
the last two or three unsearched rooms, probable cause
may be said to exist."'
Because there was only reasonable suspicion and not probable cause in Winsor, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, vacated a prior
panel opinion that had upheld the conviction, and held that the
search of the hotel room in which the suspects were actually
found was illegal. 27 7 A search for law enforcement purposes re-

quires probable cause and cannot be justified under Terry.
Winsor also bolsters another proposition which the Supreme
Court established in Arizona v. Hicks.27 In Hicks, police lawfully
entered premises from which a weapon had been fired and
"noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed

272 Id.

at 503.
id. at 507-08.
274 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
275 See id. at 1571.
276United States v. Winsor, 816 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted
and
opinion withdrawn en banc, 822 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987), and vacated en banc, 846
F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988).
277 See id. at 1398.
278 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
'n7 See
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out of place in the squalid... apartment."2 79 Suspecting that the
components were stolen, one officer moved a turntable in order
to read its serial number. This led to information that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery. 2 0 The State did not
argue that probable cause existed to move the turntable, but
rather that the movement and inspection was a "cursory' search
that was supported by reasonable suspicion." Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, rejected this argument and held that probable cause was required for the search. He declared that "[a]
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."2 82 He concluded that "wle are unwilling
to send police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description that is neither a 'plain view' inspection nor yet a 'full-blown search.'
Nothing in the prior opinions of this Court supports such a distinction ... ,,23
In Winsor, the Winsors argued that under Hicks, the police
conducted a search of their room when they knocked on the door,
commanded that it be opened, and looked inside.3 The government argued that the officers had not conducted a full-blown
search for evidence, but rather a cursory inspection requiring
only reasonable suspicion. 2 ' The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence the officers discovered when the door opened (and all
evidence found in the room thereafter) was illegally obtained,
and stated that: "[Wie refuse the government's invitation to decide this case by balancing the competing interests at stake. Instead, we adhere to the bright-line rule that Hicks appears to
have announced: The Fourth Amendment prohibits searches of
dwellings without probable cause." 6
These cases illustrate the point that the adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard has sharpened the judicial view of
probable cause.
These cases illustrate something else too,
namely that Terry and its progeny have also worked to
strengthen the distinction between searches and the limited
279

Id. at 323.
id.

280 See

281 Id. at

22

328.
Id. at 325.

2'8Id.
21

2
288

at 328-29.
See United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1572 (9th Cir. 1988).

See id.
Id. at 1579.
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forms of intrusion that Terry originally approved.
Terry also has emphasized the importance of developing
specific, articulable facts in investigations and of controlling police discretion. The stop and frisk rule permits the police to engage in what most people regard as reasonable and essential law
enforcement activity but requires them to pay attention to all of
the circumstances they confront and to articulate a reason for
their actions that may be judicially reviewed.
Chief Justice Warren recognized in Terry that no rule would
protect the public against police activity that was not intended to
gather evidence or prosecute individuals.2 87 Police officers who
want to make a show of force or to harass individuals will not be
prevented from acting by Terry.288 But, the absence of a stop and
frisk rule would not stop them either. The presence of a stop and
frisk rule makes the decision to arrest prematurely less defensible than it would be without the rule; it serves as a public recognition of the split-second judgment calls that police officers
make on the street each day.
VIII. THE TERRY FRISK
A. The Terry Requirement for a Frisk
Chief Justice Warren indicated in Terry that an officer who
is justified in believing that the person whose suspicious behavior he is investigating is armed and dangerous may conduct a
frisk of the suspect for weapons.2 9 Justice Harlan argued, in his
concurring opinion in Terry, that the right to frisk must be
"immediate and automatic" if the reason for a stop is to investigate an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence, 29 ° but he
added in his opinion, concurring in the result in Sibron, that
"although I think that, as in Terry, the right to frisk is automatic
when an officer lawfully stops a person suspected of a crime
whose nature creates a substantial likelihood that he is armed, it
is not clear that suspected possession of narcotics falls into this
category," and "[ilf the nature of the suspected offense creates no
reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I would not

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
See id. at 14-15.
28 See id. at 27.
'

288

m Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so." 291
B. The Shift Toward Reasonable Suspicion
None of the justices in Terry argued that a reasonable suspicion rule should govern frisks. Yet, just as post-Terry cases
adopted a reasonable suspicion standard for stops, these cases
adopted the same standard for frisks without asking whether the
same standard was warranted. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 2 2 for example, the Court reviewed the execution of a search warrant by
police who had been told that the bartender at a small tavern
had drugs on his person and behind the bar, and that drugs
would be sold.293 The police, who executed the warrant, frisked
Ybarra, who was standing in front of the bar when they arrived,
and all the other customers at the tavern. 2'
The factsespecially the failure to remove the drugs pursuant to the first
frisk and the conducting of a second frisk of Ybarra 2" 9 -suggest
that police may have been turning the search warrant for the bar
and bartender into a search of all customers, but the issue before
the Court was whether a stop and frisk of Ybarra was justified.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court describes Ybarra as
posing no special threat:
When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March
1, 1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the
customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized
him as a person with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no
indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or
other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault,
and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson
could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a 3/4-length
lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be
expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early
March. In short, the State is unable to articulate any
specific fact that would have justified a police officer at
29'Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
292 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
-3 See id. at 88.
2
See
295 See

id.

id. at 88-89.
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the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and
dangerous.299
As noted above, Justice Stewart interpreted Terry, upon
which the State relied, only to permit "a law enforcement officer,
for his own protection and safety,... [to] conduct a patdown to
find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in
the possession of the person he has accosted," and "not [to] permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person
happens to be on297premises where an authorized narcotics search
is taking place."

Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, dissented.298 The Chief Justice observed that he also
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent, and argued
that "[t]he Court would require a particularized and individualized suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous as a condition to a Terry search," and "[tlhis goes beyond the rationale of
Terry and overlooks the practicalities of a situation which no
doubt 29 often
confronts officers executing a valid search war9
rant.

Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun agreed. °° He reasoned as follows:
Viewed sequentially, the actions of the police in this case
satisfy the scope/justification test of reasonableness established by the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted in Terry. The police entered the Aurora Tap
pursuant to the warrant and found themselves confronting a dozen people, all standing or sitting at the bar, the
suspected location of the contraband. Because the police
were aware that heroin was being offered for sale in the
tavern, it was quite reasonable to assume that any one or
more of the persons at the bar could have been involved in
drug trafficking. This assumption, by itself, might not
have justified a full-scale search of all the individuals in
the tavern. Nevertheless, the police also were quite conscious of the possibility that one or more of the patrons
29
297

Id. at 93.

Id. at 93-94.
See id. at 96 (Burger, J., dissenting).
" Id.
at 97.
"' See id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)).
28
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could be armed in preparation for just such an intrusion.
In the narcotics business, "firearms are as much "tools of
the trade" as are most commonly recognized articles of
narcotics paraphernalia." The potential danger to the police executing the warrant and to innocent individuals in
this dimly lit tavern cannot be minimized. By conducting
an immediate frisk of those persons at the bar, the police
eliminated this danger and "froze" the area in preparation
for the search of the premises."'
Since Ybarra, the Court has insisted upon reasonable suspicion as the requirement for self-protective police conduct. In
Michigan v. Long,"2 the Court approved a Terry "frisk" that involved an officer's flashing a light into Long's car to see whether
it might contain weapons. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court reasoned that Terry permits a limited examination of an
area from which a person might gain immediate control of a
weapon. Justice O'Connor wrote that:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons."'
In Maryland v. Buie,3 4 the Court considered the legality of a
"protective sweep," a quick and limited search of premises incident to arrest for the purpose of protecting the safety of police.
The Court relied upon both Terry and Long in Justice White's
opinion:
The ingredients to apply the balance struck in Terry and
Long are present in this case. Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe Buie was in his home,
the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere
in the house in which Buie might be found. Once he was
found, however, the search for him was over.... In Terry
and Long we were concerned with the immediate interest
of the police officers in taking steps to assure themselves
Id. at 106-07.
3"2 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

20'

Id. at 1049-50 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
3'4 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
"
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that the persons with whom they were dealing were not
armed with, or able to gain immediate control of, a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against them. In the instant case, there is an analogous
interest.305
The Court has broadened Terry in terms of the geographical
scope of a Terry frisk,0 ' but it has insisted that reasonable suspicion is required to support any frisk or its equivalent. As a result, reasonable suspicion has become the overarching standard
for all actions taken under Terry, both stops and frisks, or seizures and searches.
C. The PracticalProblem
One problem with reasonable suspicion as applied to frisks
is that it assumes that the police have the same ability to gather
information relating to a frisk as to a stop, and this assumption
almost surely is false. The greater problem is that the reasonable suspicion rule leads to absurd results.
This becomes evident by comparing the facts of Pennsylvania v. Mimms..7 with those of Ybarra. In Mimms, police officers
stopped a car with an expired license plate. During the stop to
issue a traffic summons, one officer ordered Mimms from the
car."08 The Supreme Court held that, since the car was properly
stopped and thus a valid seizure had occurred, the officer had an
automatic right to order the driver out of the car."'5 Even though
the officer had no particularized reason to suspect that Mimms
was a danger, the Court found that the state had a strong interest in protecting its officers from assault and that this interest
outweighed the intrusion of having Mimms outside the car
where the officer could see him. 1 ' Although the Court did not
say so, one of the arguments for the Mimms result is that it encourages officers to use citations rather than to arrest people for
30"Id. at 332-33.

30 This expansion has not been without criticism. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Justice Stevens, dissented in Long. Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, also dissented in Buie; see also David A. Harris, FriskingEvery
Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (arguing that
lower courts are increasingly allowing frisks even where there appears to be little
danger to the police officers).
3"'
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
See id. at 107.
0 See id. at 111.

310 See

id.
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minor offenses in order to be certain that they can protect themselves from potential harm by making a search incident to an arrest.
In Ybarra, Justice Rehnquist described why police executing
a search warrant for drugs in a small tavern, with a small crowd
present, might face danger."' Whatever danger officers face in
making routine traffic stops, it must pale before the danger of
executing search warrants in drug cases. The connection between weapons and drugs is underscored daily in state and federal courts. The majority in Ybarra failed completely to tell the
police what they were supposed to do if someone in the bar
turned his back on the police, reached into a pocket, began to
move around outside the sight of the officers, or did anything
else that would fall short of reasonable suspicion but would scare
any officer who had any sense. Had no customers been present
when the officers arrived, arguably they could have prevented
entrance while they executed their warrant. But, they could not
know who would be on the scene when they arrived. Once they
were present, they had to make a judgment about danger. They
made the right judgment from a safety perspective, although
they may also have been seeking to expand Terry into a drug
search at the time, and the Supreme Court failed to pay sufficient attention to the real danger confronting the officers.
The reality is that officers who must decide whether to make
a stop may have to make a quick decision. Officers who must
decide whether to frisk sometimes may have to make an even
quicker decision, and on less information than they have relating
to the stop.
D. A Proposal
Justice Harlan had it right in his concurring opinion in
Terry and in his concurring opinion in Peters: The right to frisk
must be "immediate and automatic" if the reason for a stop is to
investigate an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence,312 however, "[ilf the nature of the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I would not permit him
to frisk unless other circumstances did so."3 3 An officer who
31' See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 106-07 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
312 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"3 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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stops someone suspected of a crime of violence is dealing with a
person who is by definition sufficiently dangerous that a frisk is
always warranted. This is not to say that all suspects in all
crimes of violence carry weapons or that all actually are dangerous. It is only to say that a reasonable suspicion standard is
satisfied in this instance.
Recognition of the automatic nature of the frisk is preferable than pretending that it is reasonable to individualize decisionmaking in these circumstances. Justice Harlan's approach is
more candid than the Supreme Court's analysis in Richards v.
Wisconsin,3" where the Court invalidated a Wisconsin Supreme
Court rule that police officers are never required to knock and
announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a
felony drug investigation.31 5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court understood that drugs and firearms are so closely intertwined in so
many situations that there always will be "reasonable suspi-

cion ,,316 which is the standard that the Court imposed to justify
the failure to knock and announce." 7
The Supreme Court in Richards rejected the notion that police officers executing a search warrant in a case involving felonious drug trafficking may always execute the warrant without
knocking and announcing their presence.3 1 8 Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court reasoned that "not every drug investigation
will pose these risks [of danger to the officer or destruction of
evidence] to a substantial degree," since "a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be
unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence." 3 9 Justice Stevens also offered the example where "the police could know that
the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that
made them impossible to destroy quickly."32 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that reasonable suspicion was required to justify
dispensing with the knock and announce rule. In referring to
the reasonable suspicion standard, he wrote that "[tjhis showing
is not high, but the police should be required to make it when314117

S. Ct. 1416 (1997).

5 See id. at 1422.
6 Id. at 1420.
317See id. at 1421-22.
318 See id. at 1422.
319 Id. at 1421.
320 Id.
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ever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged."321
The problem with the analysis is that reasonable suspicion
is a demanding standard and does require specific, articulable
facts in the context of a stop. To suggest that it is not demanding in the context of a "search" threatens to water down the
standard. What the Court may well have meant to do was to
agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that felony drug dealing is usually sufficiently dangerous that knocking and announcing while executing a warrant is unnecessary, 32 but to leave
open the possibility that when the police have specific, articulable facts that would lead them to believe that there is no danger
they must knock and announce. This would amount to a presumption that sufficient danger exists when a search warrant is
executed in a felony drug case to dispense with the knock and
announce requirement but would permit specific facts to rebut
the presumption. Such a presumption would make a good deal
of sense.
It is relatively easy to argue that a frisk should be automatic
when officers are investigating a violent crime. The harder
question is what "other circumstances" in Justice Harlan's parlance should justify self-protective activity like a frisk or a protective search. Four sets of circumstances would seem to justify
self-protection.
The first set is easy. It is any set of circumstances in which
an officer does have reasonable suspicion that a particular person is armed and dangerous. This satisfies Ybarra and Buie and
is readily defensible.
The second set of circumstances arises whenever police take
action against an individual-arresting or executing a search
warrant, for example-who they reasonably suspect is involved
with others in (a) crimes of violence, or crimes with a high likelihood that individuals will be armed, and (b) at the time and
place the police take their action they are unable to determine
whether others are actually present, and (c) their action is limited to assuring that others who pose a danger are either not
present or present and accounted for. Thus, in the Buie context,
police will not have to pretend that they were able to make a
reasonable suspicion judgment based upon Buie's actions or their
321Id.
322 See

(1997).

at 1422.
State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 227 (Wis. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1416
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observations at the scene of Buie's arrest; instead, they will be
able to make their judgment on the reasonable apprehension of
danger that exists when a person is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity with others who may be dangerous and the others are unaccounted for when the police act.
Applying this rule, police who arrest a suspect on the street
would not be able to do a protective sweep of the suspect's house,
because the danger of harm to the officers would not exist.
The third set of circumstances arises when police make a
stop under circumstances that deny them the information usually available and thus make it impossible for them to make a
reasonable judgment about danger. For example, a police officer
who makes a stop in a poorly lit place at night and is dealing
with a suspect who is wearing baggy clothing that could conceal
a weapon. When no officer can be reasonably certain that a person is not dangerous, and the circumstances-one on one contact,
darkness, and the size of a suspect, for example-indicate that
danger might be present, an officer should be able to make a
frisk. An officer should not be denied the right to self-protection
simply because the conditions surrounding the stop make it impossible to make a reasoned determination about danger.
The fourth set of circumstances arises when police encounter
a large group of individuals-in circumstances like Ybarra-in
which one or more might well be associated with the crime the
police are investigating, and it is impractical for the police to
carry out their duties and simultaneously assure their safety
without the benefit of a frisk. When several officers appear at a
place to execute a search warrant and find one person present,
the need to frisk that person may not arise. An officer can pay
careful attention and make an individualized judgment about
the person. When the same officers appear and confront a dozen
people, the opportunity for individualized judgment diminishes
and the danger increases.
IX. EXTENSION OF REASONABLE SUSPICION TO OTHER SEARCHES
As I have noted, reasonable suspicion is a defensible and
workable standard when applied to Terry stops. It is less clear,
however, whether the adoption of the reasonable suspicion standard to govern pure searches is either necessary or defensible.

1998]

A PRACTICALLY PERFECTDOCTRINE

In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,32 the Supreme Court rejected the
State's argument that students have no reasonable expectation
of privacy when they attend public schools.3" Although the
Court recognized the need for schools to maintain discipline,
Justice White wrote for the Court that "[w]e are not yet ready to
hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."3 His opinion also rejected the
state's suggestion that any privacy interest in personal property
could be maintained simply by leaving the property at home.326
The opinion concluded that "schoolchildren may find it necessary
to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items,
and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily
waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing
them onto school grounds."327 The Court held in T.L.O that the
school official's search of a student's handbag was reasonable because the searching official had reasonable suspicion that the
student had cigarettes in her bag. 28
T.L.O. involved a true search that ordinarily would have required probable cause and a warrant. The Court chose to adopt
reasonable suspicion as the standard for school searches, however, using a balancing test. Justice White wrote:
Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be
carried out without a warrant-must be based upon
"probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has
occurred. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible
requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command
of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures
be reasonable, and although "both the concept of probable
cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,... in certain limited circumstances neither is required." Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, supra, 413 U.S., at 277 (Powell, J., concurring).
Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, al3 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

See id. at 335-37.
Id. at 338-39.
326 See id. at 339.
327 Id. at 339.
328 See id. at 346.
321

323

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[72:911

though "reasonable," do not rise to the level of probable
cause. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-655, (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, [387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967)].29
I left the citations in the above quotation, because all involve
Terry stops, except Camara which requires probable cause, albeit a different kind of probable cause. The fact is that the necessity of on the spot decisionmaking is often not present in
schools, and the balance the Court struck in T.L.O. is not justified on the basis of necessity relied upon by Terry. Moreover, the
search in T.L.O. was for evidence, not for self-protection, and has
nothing whatsoever to do with the rationale for Terry.
The same point may be made with respect to Griffin v. Wisconsin.30 There, the Court addressed the question whether the
Fourth Amendment envisions a warrant which is not based upon
particularized probable cause. Griffin, a probationer, challenged
the search of his home by his probation officer. One argument in
the case was that, even if probable cause was not required for
the search of a probationer's home (due to a probationer's diminished expectation of privacy and the state's administrative interest in regulating a probationer), the Court should nonetheless
require a warrant to be obtained. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, contended that the Fourth Amendment could not be read
to provide for such a warrant. He reasoned that a warrant based
on something other than probable cause would violate the specific language in the Fourth Amendment that "no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause."3 ' He distinguished Camara as
a case where the Court "arguably came to permit an exception to
that prescription for administrative search warrants, which may
but do not necessarily have to be issued by courts."332 Justice
Scalia emphasized that the general rule for judicial search warrants is that they can only be issued upon particularized probable cause. Thus, the Court refused to accept the solution of a
warrant based on less than probable cause as a means of balancing state and individual interests. It held that a probation offi32 Id. at 340-41.

3'0
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
amend. IV.
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cer can conduct a warrantless search of a probationer's house,
upon reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.
Justice Scalia reasoned:
[Ilt is both unrealistic and destructive of the whole object
of the continuing probation relationship to insist upon the
same degree of demonstrable reliability of particular
items of supporting data, and upon the same degree of
certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts. In
some cases-especially those involving drugs or illegal
weapons-the probation agency must be able to act based
upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth
Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society. The agency, moreover, must be able to proceed on the
basis of its entire experience with the probationer, and to
assess probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his
life, character, and circumstances.
To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer,
whether or not on the basis of firsthand knowledge, to
support a probationer search. The same conclusion is
suggested by the fact that the police may be unwilling to
disclose their confidential sources to probation personnel.
For the same reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than
the ordinary citizen to violate the law, we think it enough
if the information provided indicates, as it did here, only
the likelihood ("had or might have had guns") of facts
justifying the search.333
Whatever the merits of the reasoning, it is a far cry from the
justification for using a reasonable suspicion standard in Terry
situations. The decision whether to conduct a probationer search
often need not be hurried, and if there is a rush, often Terry itself will apply. The argument that police may be reluctant to reveal their confidential sources to probation personnel sheds no
light on whether a probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard should be adopted, since both require articulable facts and
both require some judgment as to the reliability of sources.
Moreover, the search in Griffin is not limited to self-protection as

3 Id. at 879-80 (footnote omitted).
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was the search for weapons in Terry.
Thus, it is easy to defend Terry as applied to police investigations of crime and to applaud the reasonable suspicion standard as applied to stops without supporting a general balancing
approach that permits probable cause to give way to reasonable
suspicion any time the Court says it should. The rationale for a
rule of necessity is not easily extended to justify rules of convenience.
X. CONCLUSION

Terry's stop and frisk rule as developed over the past 30
years has evolved to a practically ideal approach for governing
law enforcement efforts to deal with a range of potentially criminal conduct without unnecessarily interfering with the liberty of
ordinary people. The New York Court of Appeals's prediction in
Peters that reasonable suspicion would prove to be as workable
as probable cause as a standard to govern police behavior has
turned out to be accurate. Because of Terry and its progeny, law
enforcement officers can act before crime occurs to protect society, and they can do so without compromising the probable cause
standard that governs arrests and warrants.
The frisk aspect of Terry has proved to be more problematic.
The language of Terry avoided any reasonable suspicion requirement. Of course, Terry avoided this standard for both stops
and frisks. Over time, we have learned that reasonable suspicion is a standard that works for stops, but one that is overly
demanding and insensitive to the range of situations in which
law enforcement officers may find themselves reasonably fearful
for their safety. Reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed
and dangerous is a solid reason for permitting a frisk, but it is
not the only reason. If the Supreme Court pays more careful attention to the arguments for permitting frisks or related selfprotective measures in future cases, the Terry rule will become
even more practically perfect than it presently is. The rule has
stood the test of time, but with a little refinement, it promises to
stand the test of the future.

